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ivil-military relations describe the interactions among the people of a state, 
the institutions of that state, and the military of the state. At the institutional 
level, there are “two hands on the sword.”1 The civil hand determines when to 
draw it from the scabbard and thence guides it in its use. This is the dominant 
hand of policy, the purpose for which the sword exists in the first place. The mili-
tary’s hand sharpens the sword for use and wields it in combat.2
From the time of the Revolution to the present, U.S. civil-military relations 
essentially have constituted a bargain among the aforementioned parties—the 
people, the civil government, and the military establishment—concerning the 
allocation of prerogatives and responsibilities bet-
ween the government and the military, in answer to 
five questions:3 Who controls the military instrument? 
What is the appropriate level of military influence on 
society? What is the role of the military? What pattern 
of civil-military relations best ensures military success? 
Who serves?4
From time to time throughout American history, 
certain circumstances—political, strategic, social, tech-
nological, etc.—have changed to such a degree that 
the terms of the existing civil-military bargains have 
become obsolete. The resulting disequilibrium and 
tension have led the parties to renegotiate the bargains 
in order to restore equilibrium. 
C
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This is not to say that in the United States the parties to the bargain are equal. 
The American civil-military bargain is the outcome of an “unequal dialogue.” It 
is “a dialogue, in that both [the civilian and military] sides expressed their views 
bluntly, indeed, sometimes offensively, and not once but repeatedly—and [an] 
unequal [one], in that the final authority of the civilian leader was unambiguous 
and unquestioned.”5 In the United States, the military, despite having a monopoly 
on coercive power, has generally accepted its position relative to the other parties. 
As the idea of a periodic renegotiation of the civil-military bargain would sug-
gest, there have been some fairly serious civil-military clashes over the past two 
decades. They primarily reflect changes in the security environment but also have 
been driven to some degree by changing social and political factors. 
For example, a substantial renegotiation of the civil-military bargain took 
place with the end of the Cold War. The change in the security environment oc-
casioned by the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a lack of consensus regarding 
what the military was expected to do in the new security environment. The result 
was a period of drift that had an impact on civil-military relations. During this 
period, some observers worried that the military had become more alienated from 
its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, that it had become 
politicized and partisan, that it had become resistant to civilian oversight, that 
officers had come to believe that they had the right to confront and resist civilian 
policy makers—to insist that civilian authorities heed their recommendations
—and that the military was becoming too influential in inappropriate areas of 
American society.6 
Arguably another renegotiation of the civil-military bargain began to take 
shape after the attacks of 9/11, as the military found itself fighting protracted 
irregular wars instead of the conventional wars it prefers. Illustrative of civil-
military tensions were clashes between the uniformed services and President 
George W. Bush’s first secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, over efforts to 
“transform” the military from a Cold War force to one better able to respond to 
likely future contingencies, and the planning and conduct of U.S. military opera-
tions in Afghanistan and Iraq. These tensions peaked with the so-called revolt 
of the generals in the spring of 2006, which saw a number of retired Army and 
Marine Corps generals publicly and harshly criticize Secretary Rumsfeld.7 
With Rumsfeld’s departure and the apparent success of the “surge” in Iraq, 
some expressed hope that harmony might return to American civil-military 
relations. To be sure, Rumsfeld’s successor as secretary of defense, Robert Gates, 
did a great deal to improve the civil-military climate. But subsequent events—
including Gates’s decision to fire two service secretaries and a service chief, to 
recommend against renominating the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a 
second term, and to force the retirement of a combatant commander, as well as a 
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public disagreement on military strategy between President Barack Obama and 
the ground commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, and the lat-
ter’s subsequent relief—make it clear that the state of U.S. civil-military relations 
remains contentious at best.8 
The new secretary of defense, Leon Panetta, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, as well as new service chiefs and combatant 
commanders, will be deeply involved in a likely renegotiation of the civil-military 
bargain as the country draws down from a decade of war just as it faces severe 
fiscal constraints. It is a given that the Defense Department will face substan-
tial budget reductions, placing a great deal of stress on civil-military relations. 
Whether they realize it or not, military officers of all grades, not only the most 
senior commanders, will be deeply involved in the constant negotiating that 
shapes the U.S. civil-military bargain. Here’s some of what they need to know.
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INCLUDE MORE THAN CIVILIAN 
CONTROL
Most of the debate over American civil-military relations since the 1990s has 
been dominated by concerns about civilian control of the military establishment. 
Indeed, some observers believe that the focus on civilian control has obscured 
other equally important elements of civil-military relations.9 But as noted above, 
the domain of civil-military relations encompasses four questions in addition to 
control of the military.
The first additional question raises the issue of what degree of military influ-
ence is appropriate in a liberal society such as the United States. The extreme form 
of military influence in society is militarism, a state of affairs in which military 
values predominate and the military devours a disproportionate share of society’s 
resources. What is the proper scope of military affairs? In today’s environment, 
what constitutes military expertise? Does it go beyond what Samuel Huntington 
called in The Soldier and the State, his classic study of civil-military relations, the 
“management of violence”?10 Should it? 
For instance, to what extent should the military influence foreign policy? Has 
American foreign policy become “militarized”? Do combatant commanders ex-
ercise too much power? Have they become the new “viceroys” or “proconsuls”?11 
What is proper regarding the military and domestic politics? Should active-duty 
officers be writing op-eds in support of particular programs or policies? Should 
retired officers get involved in partisan politics? What is the military’s proper role 
in influencing the allocation of resources? 
Next, what is the appropriate role of the military? Is the military establishment’s 
purpose to fight and win the nation’s wars or to engage in constabulary actions? 
What kind of wars should the military prepare to fight? Should the focus of the 
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military be foreign or domestic? The United States has answered this question 
differently at different times and under different circumstances. For example, 
throughout most of its history the U.S. Army was a constabulary force. It perma-
nently oriented itself toward large-scale conflicts against foreign enemies only in 
the 1930s. The end of the Cold War and the attacks of 9/11 have suggested new 
answers—for example, a focus on “irregular warfare” (counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism), as well as an openness to the use of the military in domestic 
affairs, such as disaster relief in response to emergencies like Katrina, domestic 
law enforcement during the Los Angeles riots, or border security. What impact 
do such issues have on civil-military relations? 
Next, what pattern of civil-military relations best ensures the effectiveness of the 
military instrument? All of the other questions mean little if the military instru-
ment is unable to ensure the survival of the state. If there is no constitution, the 
question of constitutional balance doesn’t matter. Does effectiveness require a 
military culture distinct in some ways from the society it serves? What impact 
does societal structure have on military effectiveness? What impact does political 
structure exert? What impact does the pattern of civil-military relations have on 
the effectiveness of strategic decision-making processes? 
And finally, who serves? Is military service an obligation of citizenship, or 
something else? How are enlisted members recruited and retained? How should 
the U.S. military address issues of “diversity” in the force? What about reserves, 
racial and ethnic minorities, women, and homosexuals? 
Obviously, questions regarding military service have been answered by Ameri-
cans in various ways. Through most of its early history, the United States main-
tained a small regular peacetime establishment that mostly conducted limited 
constabulary operations. During wartime, the several states were responsible for 
raising soldiers for federal service, either as militia or volunteers. 
While the United States resorted to a draft during the Civil War and again dur-
ing World War I, conscription became the norm in the United States only from 
the eve of World War II until the 1970s. Today the U.S. military is a volunteer 
professional force. But even now the force continues to evolve, as debates over 
such issues as the role of the reserve components in the post-9/11 military force, 
women in combat, service by open homosexuals, and the recruitment of religious 
minorities, especially Muslims, make clear. 
The question of civilian control is important, but a myopic focus on this issue 
means that other important questions are often ignored. In addition, the fact that 
liberal societies like the United States often take civilian control for granted raises 
several further questions: Does civilian control refer simply to the dominance of 
civilians within the executive branch—the president or the secretary of defense? 
What is the role of the legislative branch in controlling the military instrument? 
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Is the military establishment “unified,” that is, does it speak with anything like a 
single voice vis-à-vis the civil government? 
What is the nature of military advice? Should military leaders “insist” that 
their advice be heeded? What courses of action are available to military leaders 
who believe the civilian authorities are making bad decisions? In other words, is 
there something that might be called a “calculus of dissent” that military leaders 
can invoke in cases where they believe civilian decisions are dangerous to the 
health of the country? These issues, addressed below, are part and parcel of what 
officers need to know about civil-military relations.12 
CIVILIAN CONTROL INVOLVES NOT ONLY THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH 
It involves Congress as well. As the constitutional scholar Edward Corwin once 
famously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilege 
of directing American foreign policy” between Congress and the president.13 But 
there is a similar tension at work with regard to civil-military relations. Those 
who neglect the congressional role in American civil-military relations are miss-
ing an important element.14 
The military has two civilian masters, and this has implications for civil-
military relations that officers must understand. For instance, while the president 
and secretary of defense control the military when it comes to the use of force, in-
cluding strategy and rules of engagement, Congress controls the military directly 
with regard to force size, equipment, and organization, and indirectly regarding 
doctrine and personnel. Indeed, Congress is the “force planner” of last resort. 
The U.S. military accepts civilian control by both Congress and the president 
but offers advice intended to maintain its own institutional and professional 
autonomy. On use of force, the military is usually granted a good deal of leeway 
regarding the terms and conditions for such use. 
By not dissenting from executive-branch policy, American military officers 
implicitly agree to support presidential decisions on the budget and the use of 
force, but they also must recognize an obligation to provide their alternative 
personal views in response to Congress. However, officers must recognize that 
Congress exerts its control with less regard for military preferences than for 
the political considerations of its individual members and committees. Thus 
congressional control of the military is strongly influenced by political consider-
ations, by what Samuel Huntington called “structural,” or domestic, imperatives 
as opposed to strategic ones. 
When the president and Congress are in agreement, the military complies. 
When the two branches are in disagreement, the military tends to side with the 
branch that most favors its own views, but never to the point of direct disobedience 
5
Owens: What Military Officers Need to Know about Civil-Military Relation
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
 72  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
to orders of the commander in chief. Military officers are obligated to share their 
views with Congress. Doing so should not be treated as an “end run” undermin-
ing civilian control of the military.15 
THE ABSENCE OF A COUP 
The absence of a coup does not indicate that civil-military relations are healthy or 
that civilian control has not eroded. All too often, officers seem to believe that if 
the United States does not face the prospect of a Latin American– or African-style 
military coup d’état, all is well in the realm of civil-military relations. But this is a 
straw man. A number of scholars, including Richard Kohn, Peter Feaver, the late 
Russell Weigley, Michael Desch, and Eliot Cohen, have argued that although there 
is no threat of a coup on the part of the military, American civil-military relations 
have nonetheless deteriorated over the past two decades.16 
Their concern is that the American military “has grown in influence to the 
point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies and deci-
sions,” which manifests itself in “repeated efforts on the part of the armed forces 
to frustrate or evade civilian authority when that opposition seems likely to 
preclude outcomes the military dislikes.” The result is an unhealthy civil-military 
pattern that “could alter the character of American government and undermine 
national defense.”17 
In theory, Kohn argues, “civilians have the authority to issue virtually any or-
der and organize the military in any fashion they choose.” 
But in practice, the relationship is far more complex. Both sides frequently disagree 
among themselves. Further, the military can evade or circumscribe civilian authority 
by framing the alternatives or tailoring their advice or predicting nasty consequences; 
by leaking information or appealing to public opinion (through various indirect 
channels, like lobbying groups or retired generals and admirals); or by approaching 
friends in the Congress for support. They can even fail to implement decisions, or 
carry them out in such a way as to stymie their intent. . . . We are not talking about a 
coup here, or anything else demonstrably illegal; we are talking about who calls the 
tune in military affairs in the United States today.18 
But this seems to support the contention that actual civil-military relations rep-
resent the outcome of constant bargaining. 
Kohn argues that balanced civil-military relations in the United States have 
traditionally rested on four foundations, which, he argues, have eroded: the rule 
of law and reverence for the Constitution; a small force in peacetime; reliance on 
the citizen-soldier; and the military’s own internalization of military subordina-
tion to civilian control. Kohn cites Major General John J. Pershing’s instructions 
to First Lieutenant George Patton in 1916: “You must remember that when we 
enter the army we do so with the full knowledge that our first duty is toward the 
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government, entirely regardless of our own views under any given circumstances. 
We are at liberty to express our personal views only when called upon to do so or 
else confidentially to our friends, but always confidentially and with the complete 
understanding that they are in no sense to govern our actions.” Or in the words 
of Omar Bradley, the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Thirty-two years 
in the peacetime army had taught me to do my job, hold my tongue, and keep my 
name out of the papers.”19
While Kohn acknowledges that civil-military tensions are not new, he argues 
that current conditions are such that the threat of military insubordination is 
much greater than in the past. First, thanks to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, 
the military is united in an unprecedented way. Whereas in the past the armed 
services often were at odds over roles, missions, budgets, and weapons systems, 
today they can work together to shape, oppose, evade, or thwart the choices civil-
ians make. Of course in view of the upcoming budgetary battles that can be ex-
pected over the next few years as resources for defense are substantially reduced, 
this unity may well deteriorate. 
Second, many of the issues in play today reach far beyond the narrowly mili-
tary, not only to the wider realm of national security but often to foreign relations 
more broadly. In certain cases military affairs even affect the character and values 
of American society itself. Kohn argues that this expanded role represents a sig-
nificant encroachment on civilian control of the military. Third, military advice 
and advocacy are now much more public than they once were. Fourth, senior 
officers now lead a large, permanent peacetime military establishment that dif-
fers fundamentally from any of its predecessors. Kohn argues that this military is 
increasingly disconnected, even estranged, from civilian society, while at the same 
time it is becoming a recognizable interest group, “larger, more bureaucratically 
active, more political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than 
anything similar in American history.”20 
According to Kohn, the erosion of civilian control gives rise to “toxic” civil-
military relations, which, he argues, damage national security in at least three 
ways: by paralyzing national security policy; by obstructing or even sabotaging 
the ability of the United States to intervene in foreign crises or to exercise inter-
national leadership; and by undermining the confidence of the military as an 
institution in its own uniformed leadership.21 
The military has “pushed back” against civilian leadership on numerous occa-
sions during the last two decades. This pushback has manifested itself (to use Pe-
ter Feaver’s formulation) in various forms of “shirking”—“foot dragging,” “slow 
rolling,” and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy or individual policy 
makers.22 Such actions were rampant during the William Clinton presidency and 
during the tenure of Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense. Such pushback is 
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based on the claim that civilians are making decisions without paying sufficient 
attention to the military point of view. This leads to the next principle of civil-
military relations: officers have an obligation to make their case as strongly as 
possible but do not have the right to “insist” that their advice be accepted. How-
ever, there must be a “calculus of dissent.”
MILITARY ADVICE: PROFESSIONAL SUPREMACISTS VS. CIVILIAN 
SUPREMACISTS
During the 1990s, some military officers explicitly adopted the view that soldiers 
have the right to a voice in making policy regarding the use of the military instru-
ment, that indeed they have the right to insist that their views be adopted. This 
assumption has been encouraged by a serious misreading of a very important 
book by H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.23 
The subject of Dereliction of Duty is the failure of the Joint Chiefs to challenge 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara adequately during the Vietnam War. Many 
serving officers believe the book effectively makes the case that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff should have more openly opposed the Lyndon Johnson administration’s 
strategy of gradualism and then resigned rather than carry out the policy. But 
the book says no such thing. While McMaster convincingly argues that the chiefs 
failed to present their views frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors, 
including members of Congress, he neither says nor implies that they should 
have obstructed President Johnson’s orders and policies through leaks, public 
statements, or resignation. 
This misreading of Dereliction of Duty has dangerously reinforced the increas-
ingly widespread belief among officers that they should be advocates of particular 
policies rather than simply serving in their traditional advisory role. For instance, 
according to a survey of officer and civilian attitudes and opinions undertaken 
by Ole Holsti for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) in 1998–99, 
“many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian 
decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American 
forces abroad.” 
Peter Feaver has called this view “McMasterism,” in order to distinguish it 
from McMaster’s own, more nuanced argument. McMasterism essentially argues 
that, first, civilians actively try to suppress the military’s opinion; second, mili-
tary opinion is right, or at least more right than civilian opinion; and third, the 
military should ensure not only that its voice is heard but also that it is heeded. 
McMasterism essentially blames the U.S. failures in Iraq that predated the surge 
on the generals, because, it claims, they went along with civilian preferences 
rather than blocking them.24 
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Two recent and widely disseminated examples of McMasterism are Army lieu-
tenant colonel Paul Yingling’s “A Failure of Generalship” and Marine lieutenant 
colonel Andrew Milburn’s “Breaking Ranks.” The former exhorts the generals to 
“find their voices” and excoriates them for not making “their objections public.” 
The latter states that “there are circumstances under which a military officer is 
not only justified but also obligated to disobey a legal order.”25 
Feaver argues that McMasterism reflects the viewpoint of what he calls the 
“professional [military] supremacists,” who argue that the primary civil-military-
relations problem during wartime is ensuring that the military can prevent the 
civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging. But “civilian supremacists” 
contend that this view of the role of military leaders is questionable and at odds 
with the principles and practice of American civil-military relations.
McMasterism is reflected in the TISS study cited above. When “asked whether 
military leaders should be neutral, advise, advocate, or insist on having their way 
in the decision” to use military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming 
active-duty officers who responded answered that leaders should “insist” regard-
ing the following issues: “setting rules of engagement, ensuring that clear political 
and military goals exist, developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and “deciding what kinds 
of military units will be used to accomplish all tasks.” In the context of the ques-
tionnaire, “insist” definitely implied that officers should try to compel acceptance 
of the military’s recommendations.26 There is little to suggest that this view has 
changed. 
According to the civilian supremacists, the uniformed military in the Ameri-
can system does not possess a veto over policy. Indeed, civilians even have the 
authority to make decisions in what would seem to be the realm of purely mili-
tary affairs. This school of thought holds that “the primary problem of [wartime 
civil-military relations] is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance 
is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with 
that direction.”27 They add that the record illustrates that the judgment of the 
military is not necessarily superior to that of civilian decision makers. 
Consider some historical examples. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln 
constantly prodded George McClellan to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862. 
McClellan just as constantly whined about insufficient forces. During World War 
II, despite the image of civil-military comity, there were many differences be-
tween Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. George Marshall, the greatest 
soldier-statesman since Washington, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in 
1940 and argued for a cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. 
History has vindicated Lincoln and Roosevelt. 
Similarly, many observers, especially those in the uniformed military, have 
been inclined to blame the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on the civilians. But the 
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American operational approach in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed 
military. The consensus today is that the operational strategy of General William 
Westmoreland was counterproductive; it did not make sense to emphasize attri-
tion of People’s Army of Vietnam forces in a “war of the big battalions”—that is, 
one involving sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy 
the enemy with superior firepower. By the time Westmoreland’s successor could 
adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late.28 
During the planning for Operation DESERT STORM in late 1990 and early 
1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM), presented a plan calling for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions 
in southern Kuwait followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. The problem was that 
this plan was unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the ground 
war—the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam’s Republican Guard. The 
civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by CENTCOM and or-
dered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative 
and effective, a further indication that in wartime the military does not always 
know best.29
This pattern persisted in Iraq. For instance, while Secretary of Defense Rums-
feld did not foresee the insurgency or the shift from conventional to guerilla war, 
neither did his critics in the uniformed services. In December 2004, Tom Ricks 
reported in the Washington Post that while many in the Army blamed “Defense 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpect-
edly difficult occupation of Iraq,” one close observer—U.S. Army major Isaiah 
Wilson III, an official historian of the campaign and later a war planner in Iraq—
placed the blame squarely on the Army.30 In an unpublished report, he concluded 
that senior Army commanders had failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq 
and therefore did not plan properly for victory, that Army planners suffered 
from “stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt,” and that Army commanders 
in 2004 still misunderstood the strategic problem they faced and therefore were 
still pursuing a flawed approach. 
Critics also charged that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon shortchanged the troops in Iraq, 
in part by failing to provide them with armored “Humvees.” Yet a review of Army 
budget submissions makes it clear that the Army did not immediately ask for the 
vehicles; its priority, as is usually the case with the uniformed services, was to 
acquire “big ticket” items. It was only after the insurgency began and the threat 
posed by “improvised explosive devices” became apparent that the Army began 
to push for supplemental spending to “up-armor” the utility vehicles. 
While it is true that Rumsfeld downplayed the need to prepare for postconflict 
stability operations, it is also the case that in doing so he was merely ratifying the 
preferences of the uniformed military. Only recently has the uniformed military 
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begun to shed the “Weinberger Doctrine,” a set of principles long internalized 
by the U.S. military that emphasize the requirement for an “exit strategy.” But 
if generals are thinking about an exit strategy, they are not thinking about “war 
termination”—how to convert military success into political success, which is 
the purpose of postconflict planning and stability operations. This cultural aver-
sion to stability operations is reflected in the fact that operational planning for 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM took eighteen months, while planning for postwar 
stabilization began (halfheartedly) only a couple of months before the invasion.31 
It should also be noted that the most frequently cited example of prescience 
on the part of the uniformed military—General Eric Shinseki’s February 2003 
statement before Congress suggesting that “several hundred thousand” troops 
might be necessary in postwar Iraq—was no such thing. As John Garofano has 
observed, “no extensive analysis has surfaced as supporting Shinseki’s figures, 
which were dragged out of him by Senator Carl Levin only after repeated ques-
tioning.” Garofano notes that in fact the figures were based on a “straight-line 
extrapolation from very different environments.”32 That is, the Army’s Center of 
Military History based a figure of 470,000 troops for Iraq on the service’s experi-
ences in Bosnia and Kosovo, where the primary mission had been peacekeeping. 
This effort to estimate necessary troop strength was inept—critics called it naive, 
unrealistic, and “like a war college exercise” rather than serious planning.33
Finally, to the extent that Shinseki was correct, he was correct for the wrong 
reasons. His focus was on humanitarian concerns rather than on the critical 
society-building work that the U.S. military had to implement in Iraq.34 Garofano 
concludes that the oft-made charge against Rumsfeld—that he punished Shinseki 
for “being right”—is not supported by the evidence. War planning “comes down, 
as it did in Vietnam, to analysis, getting it right, and providing clear alternatives 
that address or confront policy goals.”35 This the uniformed military in general 
and Shinseki in particular failed to do.
THE “CALCULUS OF DISSENT” 
This is not to suggest that the military has no option if military advice is not 
heeded. The minimalist position is articulated in The Armed Forces Officer, an 
official publication that lays out the moral-ethical aspects of officership and the 
question of military deference to civilian authority in very stark terms: “Hav-
ing rendered their candid expert judgment, professionals are bound by oath to 
execute legal civilian decisions as effectively as possible—even those with which 
they fundamentally disagree—or they must request relief from their duties, or 
leave the service entirely, either by resignation or retirement.”36
Many have argued that the choices provided by The Armed Forces Officer are 
too narrow. They contend that in terms of Albert Hirschman’s classic study of 
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responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states, the publication offers of-
ficers only the choices of “loyalty” and “exit.” But Hirschman argues that under 
certain circumstances, the institutionalization of greater “voice”—that is, dissent
—can help stem massive exit.37 
For instance, Leonard Wong and Douglas Lovelace write that there are alterna-
tives “beyond blind obedience, resignation or retirement.”38 They propose a range 
of actions available to senior military leaders to achieve Hirschman’s “voice” 
when confronted with decisions by civilian leaders that they believe are flawed. 
They identify two variables: the degree of civilian resistance to military advice 
and the seriousness of the threat to national security that the policy embodies. 
When the degree of civilian resistance to military advice is low and the mag-
nitude of the threat is low, the options for the military are acquiescence or com-
promise. When resistance to military advice is low but the threat is high, options 
involve frequent interaction between the uniformed military and the civilians, 
work to achieve consensus, and cooperative analysis. 
When the degree of civilian resistance to military advice is high and the mag-
nitude of the threat is low, the options for military officers include declining ad-
vancement or assignment, requesting relief, waiting the civilians out, or retiring. 
When both civilian resistance to military advice and the level of the threat are 
high, the authors suggest, options range from a public information campaign, 
writing articles, testifying before Congress, and joining efforts with others to 
resignation.39 
Don Snider accepts the idea of broadening the choices available to uniformed 
officers when faced with what they believe to be flawed policy decisions by civil-
ians but questions whether the two variables employed by Wong and Lovelace 
alone provide adequate guidance for a strategic leader of the American military 
profession who is considering dissent.40 For Snider, the imperatives of military 
professionalism and the “trust” relationship between the military profession and 
other entities within American society and government also must play roles. 
Snider suggests three trust relationships, to be rated along a continuum rang-
ing from “fully trusted”—the ideal—to “not trustworthy.” The three relationships 
are that between the military profession and the American people; that between 
the military profession and the people’s elected representatives, in both the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches; and that between senior leaders of the military 
profession and their subordinate leaders.41
Following Huntington, Snider identifies three responsibilities of military lead-
ers. The first is the “representative function,” the professional requirement “to 
represent the claims of military security within the state machinery”—that is, to 
“express their expert point of view on any matter touching the creation, mainte-
nance, use, or contemplated use of the armed forces.” The second responsibility is 
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to exercise the “advisory function.” This is the professional imperative “to analyze 
and to report on the implications of alternative courses of action from the mili-
tary point of view,” and to provide “candid professional military advice to elected 
and appointed civilian leaders, regardless of whether the advice was solicited or 
regardless of whether the advice is likely to be welcomed.” Such advice does not 
include policy advocacy, which both Huntington and Snider consider beyond 
the legitimate role of military officers. The third responsibility is to exercise the 
“executive function.” This requires the military professional “to implement state 
decisions with respect to state security even if it is a decision which runs violently 
counter to his military judgment.”42 
Having laid out the three trust relationships and the three responsibilities of 
professional military leaders, Snider addresses how the “other” in each trust rela-
tionship involving the military profession—respectively, the American people, ci-
vilian leaders, and junior leaders within the military profession itself—perceives 
and understands acts of dissent on the part of the military profession’s senior 
leaders. Such a moral analysis, he argues, must address at least five considerations.
The first is the gravity of the issue to the nation and therefore to the clients of 
the military profession. The second is the relevance of the strategic leader’s exper-
tise with regard to the issue that might impel dissent. Does the issue at hand fall 
squarely within the scope of the dissenter’s expertise as a military professional? 
The third consideration is the degree of sacrifice on the part of the dissenter. Is 
the dissent motivated solely by a disinterested desire to serve the nation, even 
in the face of personal sacrifice, or does it involve a self-serving subtext, such as 
the advancement of the dissenter’s own professional or political ambitions? The 
fourth consideration is the timing of the act of dissent. Was it timed to undercut 
the actions or policy from which the officer wishes to dissent? Finally, is the act 
of dissent congruent with the prior, long-term character and beliefs of the dis-
senter? Does the dissent strike those who know the dissenter as uncharacteristic 
or atypical?43 Snider goes on to argue that a complete assessment on the part of 
the dissenter would analyze the five considerations in the light of the three trust 
relationships. 
Of course, in practice, argues Snider, some factors are more salient than others. 
Like Wong and Lovelace, he believes that the gravity of the issue with regard to 
national security is most important. “Logically, the higher the stakes, the greater 
the temptation and justification will be for dissenters to speak out.”44 This is the 
case because the only reason to have a military is to ensure national security. That 
is what the military profession is all about. Of course, to engage in dissent, no 
matter the stakes, seems to be in conflict with the inviolate principle of the subor-
dination of the military to civilian authority. The interpretation of acts of dissent 
is complicated, argues Snider, by the deeply polarized nature of American politics 
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today and the perception on the part of some that the military as an institution 
has become too identified with the Republican Party.45 
The moral calculus of dissent also requires that we consider the relevance of 
the expertise and knowledge of the dissenter. Why should we listen to the dis-
senter? “If the issue does not fit within the compass of the profession’s expertise, 
or only marginally so, one would expect observers to dismiss dissenters as free-
lancers operating without standing, much as an Oscar-winning Hollywood actor 
who sets up shop as an authority on national defense.”46
Part of the problem with this criterion is that the meaning of professional 
military expertise has changed since Huntington’s time. Following Harold Lass-
well, Huntington referred to the expertise of the professional military officer as 
the “management of violence.” But today that description seems far too narrow. 
The fact is that today’s military officer is really a “national security professional,” 
whose expertise extends to the interconnected intellectual space of everything 
from strategic theory, strategic thinking, and strategy formation to diplomacy, 
nation building, and homeland defense.47 Thus in practice it is sometimes dif-
ficult to differentiate between what military and civilian national security pro-
fessionals do.48 As historical examples cited earlier illustrate, even when it comes 
to purely military affairs the professional military officer is not necessarily more 
correct than the civilians.
The sacrifice incurred by the dissenter and the timing of the dissent must be 
judged according to the standard of common sense. “For the true professional, a 
right understanding of one’s loyalties always places loyalty to self dead last. Thus, 
absent personal sacrifice, such dissent quickly leads to the suspicion of and the 
search for ulterior motives.”49 The same applies to the timing of the dissent. “If 
something is worthy of an act of dissent, then it is worthy. Thus, as soon as that 
is discerned and decided by the strategic leader, the act should follow immedi-
ately.” If there is a substantial delay, the other partners in the trust relationship, 
especially the subordinate leaders within the profession, may suspect a lack of 
moral agency on the part of the dissenter as well as the impact of ulterior mo-
tives on the act.
Finally, it is critical that the strategic leader contemplating dissent be an au-
thentic leader of competence and moral integrity who has previously displayed a 
steadfastness of character. Subordinates who judge leaders to be cynical or lack-
ing in integrity are unlikely to construe an act of dissent by such individuals as 
disinterested. 
In principle, U.S. military officers accept civilian control and recognize the 
limits of dissent. But as the previous discussion illustrates, the actual practice of 
military subordination is complicated by a number of factors. The first of these 
is organizational and institutional—the separation of powers related to military 
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affairs between the executive and legislative branches. But even more important 
is the tension between the loyalty and obedience of military professionals, on 
the one hand, and their military judgment and moral beliefs, on the other. The 
civil-military tensions visible both before and since 9/11 are illustrative of these 
complications. 
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND SERVICE DOCTRINES 
The combination of civil-military relations patterns and service doctrines affect 
military effectiveness. In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pat-
tern is how well it contributes to the effectiveness of a state’s military, especially at 
the level of strategic assessment and strategy making.50 However, Richard Kohn 
has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military in 
this realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of operations other 
than those associated with large-scale conventional war. “Nearly twenty years 
after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money 
than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat in-
surgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each 
with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations’ 
governments in a matter of weeks.”51 
He attributes this lack of effectiveness to a decline in the military’s professional 
competence with regard to strategic planning. “In effect, in the most important 
area of professional expertise—the connecting of war to policy, of operations to 
achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has been found 
wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, 
weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with 
strategy.”52 
This phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, in recent failure to adapt to a 
changing security environment in which the challenges to global stability are “less 
from massed armies than from terrorism; economic and particularly financial 
instability; failed states; resource scarcity (particularly oil and potable water); 
pandemic disease; climate change; and international crime in the form of piracy, 
smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized lawlessness.” He 
observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in 
which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign 
and national security policies. He echoes the claim of Colin Gray: “All too often, 
there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside.”53 Is there some-
thing inherent in current U.S. civil-military affairs that accounts for this failure 
of strategy?
The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be 
attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of these is the continued 
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dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the 
“normal” theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is a clear line of 
demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uni-
formed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W. 
Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the “surge” 
in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since 
the Vietnam War. Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon 
Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was 
the cause of American defeat in Vietnam. 
The normal theory can be traced to Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the 
State, in which he sought a solution to the dilemma that lies at the heart of civil-
military relations—how to guarantee civilian control of the military while still en-
suring the ability of the uniformed military to provide security. His solution was a 
mechanism for creating and maintaining a professional, apolitical military estab-
lishment, which he called “objective control.” Such a professional military would 
focus on defending the United States but avoid threatening civilian control.54
But as Cohen has pointed out, the normal theory of civil-military relations 
often has not held in practice. Indeed, such storied democratic war leaders as 
Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln “trespassed” on the military’s turf as a 
matter of course, influencing not only strategy and operations but also tactics. 
The reason that civilian leaders cannot simply leave the military to its own de-
vices during war is that war is an iterative process involving the interplay of ac-
tive wills. What appears to be the case at the outset of the war may change as the 
war continues, modifying the relationship between political goals and military 
means. The fact remains that wars are not fought for their own purposes but to 
achieve policy goals set by the political leadership of the state. 
The second factor, strongly reinforced by the normal theory of civil-military 
relations, is the influence of the uniformed services’ organizational cultures. Each 
military service is built around a “strategic concept” that, according to Samuel 
Huntington, constitutes “the fundamental element of a military service,” the 
basic “statement of [its] role . . . or purpose in implementing national policy.”55 A 
clear strategic concept is critical to the ability of a service to organize and employ 
the resources that Congress allocates to it.
It also largely determines a service’s organizational culture. Some years ago, 
the late Carl Builder of the RAND Corporation wrote The Masks of War, in which 
he demonstrated the importance of the organizational cultures of the various 
military services in creating their differing “personalities,” identities, and behav-
iors. His point was that each service possesses a preferred way of fighting and 
that “the unique service identities . . . are likely to persist for a very long time.”56 
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The organizational culture of a service, in turn, exerts a strong influence on 
civil-military relations, frequently constraining what civilian leaders can do and 
often constituting an obstacle to change and innovation. The critical question 
here is this: Who decides whether the military instrument is effective, the civilian 
policy makers or the military itself? 
An illuminating illustration of this phenomenon at work has been the recent 
attempt to institutionalize counterinsurgency doctrine within the U.S. Army. 
This is a difficult task, given the service’s focus on the “operational level of war,” 
which manifests itself as a preference for fighting large-scale conventional war—
despite the fact that throughout most of its existence, the conflicts in which the 
U.S. Army engaged were actually irregular wars. Beginning in the late 1970s, the 
Army embraced the idea of the operational level of war as its central organizing 
concept. This made sense in light of that service’s major war-fighting concern of 
the time—defeating Warsaw Pact forces on the Central Front of Europe—but 
also, as Hew Strachan has observed, “the operational level of war appeals to 
armies: it functions in a politics-free zone and it puts primacy on professional 
skills.”57 
Herein lies the problem for civil-military relations: the disjunction between 
operational excellence in combat and policy, which determines the reasons for 
which a particular war is to be fought. The combination of the dominant posi-
tion of the normal theory of civil-military relations in the United States and the 
military’s focus on the nonpolitical operational level of war means that all too 
often the conduct of a war is disconnected from the goals of the war.
As an essay published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Insti-
tute puts it, the operational level of war has become an “alien” that has devoured 
strategy. 
Rather than meeting its original purpose of contributing to the attainment of 
campaign objectives laid down by strategy, operational art—practiced as a “level of 
war”—assumed responsibility for campaign planning. This reduced political leader-
ship to the role of “strategic sponsors,” quite specifically widening the gap between 
politics and warfare. The result has been a well-demonstrated ability to win battles 
that have not always contributed to strategic success, producing “a way of battle” 
rather than a way of war.
The political leadership of a country cannot simply set objectives for a war, provide 
the requisite materiel, then stand back and await victory. Nor should the nation or its 
military be seduced by this prospect. Politicians should be involved in the minute-
to-minute conduct of war; as Clausewitz reminds us, political considerations are 
“influential in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even of the battle.”58 
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The task of strategy is to bring doctrine—concerned with fighting battles in 
support of campaigns—into line with national policy. But instead of strategy, we 
have Gray’s “black hole.”
The third factor contributing to the perseverance of the American strategic 
black hole is one that was, ironically, intended to improve U.S. strategic planning
—the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. In 
passing Goldwater-Nichols, Congress sought to address two central concerns: the 
excessive power and influence of the separate services and the mismatch between 
the authority of the combatant commanders and their responsibilities. The act 
increased the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff while reducing 
that of the Joint Chiefs themselves, and it increased the authority of the theater 
commanders. Congress expected that such reorganization would, among other 
things, improve the quality of military advice to policy makers. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for integrating theater strategy and 
national policy. But if they are marginalized, as they were during much of the 
Bush administration, such integration does not occur. This is an institutional 
problem illustrated by the case of General Tommy Franks, the commander of 
U.S. Central Command, who, in directing the war in Afghanistan after 9/11 and 
the first phase of the war in Iraq, was able to bypass the Joint Staff. His justifica-
tion is found in his memoirs, American Soldier: “Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan had been nitpicked by the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff, and I 
did not intend to see a recurrence of such divisiveness in Iraq.” He essentially sent 
a message to the chairman, the service chiefs, and the Joint Staff: “Keep Wash-
ington focused on policy and strategy. Leave me the hell alone to run the war.”59 
Of course, such an attitude is a dysfunctional consequence of the well-intentioned 
institutional arrangement created by Goldwater-Nichols, reinforcing as it does the 
idea that there is an autonomous realm of military action within which civilians 
have no role. The result of such a disjunction between the military and political 
realms is that war plans may not be integrated with national policy and that strat-
egy, despite lip service to its importance, in practice becomes an orphan. In the 
absence of strategy, other factors rush to fill the void, resulting in strategic drift. 
The current civil-military framework fails to provide strategic guidance for 
integrating the operational level of war and national policy. Rectifying this situ-
ation requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain adjust the way they 
do business.
{LINE-SPACE}
U.S. civil-military relations since 9/11 raise a number of issues. How informed 
are civilian leaders when they choose to commit the military instrument? How 
well does the prevailing pattern of civil-military relations enable the integration 
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of divergent and even contradictory views? Does this pattern ensure a practical 
military strategy that properly serves the ends of national policy? 
The state of post-9/11 American civil-military relations also points to the issue 
of trust—the mutual respect and understanding between civilian and military 
leaders and the exchange of candid views and perspectives between the two par-
ties as part of the decision-making process. 
Establishing trust requires that both parties to the civil-military bargain re-
examine their mutual relationship. On the one hand, the military must recover 
its voice in the making of strategy, while realizing that politics permeates the 
conduct of war and that civilians have the final say, not only concerning the goals 
of the war but also how it is conducted. On the other, civilians must understand 
that implementing effective policy and strategy requires the proper military in-
strument and therefore must insist that soldiers present their views frankly and 
forcefully throughout the strategy-making and implementation process. This is 
the key to healthy civil-military relations. 
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